The Innocence Project of Texas

Everyone knows that defendants are “presumed innocent” before they are convicted. Prosecutors must overcome this basic presumption beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction. But is the innocence that’s “presumed” the same as “actual innocence” for purposes of applying Texas’ compensation statute for wrongful convictions?

That’s a legal hair the courts are just beginning to split, and it’ll be interesting to see where the line is finally drawn. The Austin appellate court made what may not be a justifiable distinction in the case of first impression on the subject.

A three judge panel from the Austin Court of Appeals last month reversed a district court decision equating “actual innocence” with “presumed innocence.” The Court of Appeals says a TDCJ inmate whose conviction was overturned on appeal for insufficient evidence is not entitled to restitution under Texas’ wrongful conviction statutes. Here’s a description of the case from Hacklawyer:

The State of Texas recently appealed a trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction of an ex-TDC inmate’s suit who sued for monetary damages for wrongful imprisonment. He was originally indicted for delivery of controlled substances, tried and sentenced to the penitentiary. However, on appeal, he secured a reversal and acquittal based on legal insufficiency of evidence. In its appeal, the State argued that the wrongful imprisonment statute was originally enacted to address only those claimants who have obtained habeas corpus relief based on “actual innocence” as opposed to a reversal based on lack of sufficient evidence. The Austin Court of Appeals agreed. Claimant’s case was dismissed for lack of jurisidiction. The waiver of sovereign immunity found in chapter 103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is limited solely to those persons found innocent via an art. 11.07 or 11.071writ of habeas corpus. see State v. Young, slip opinion no. 03-07-00572-CV, Austin Court of Appeals, July 31, 2008.

The defendant, Marion Young, was convicted of a drug charge based on the uncorroborated testimony from a confidential informant. The First Court of Appeals overturned the case because Texas law does not allow convictions based on stand-alone snitch testimony in drug cases. Because he spent time in prison when the state had not overcome its presumption, argued Young, the law demands he should be presumed innocent and compensated for the harm.

The Austin Appeals Court, however, said they could divine the “legislature’s intent to limit chapter 103’s waiver solely to claimants who have obtained habeas corpus relief.” At first glance, the statute regarding compensation mentions nothing about habeas proceedings. Here’s the full text of the portion of Chapter 103 regarding who is eligible for compensation:

§ 103.001. CLAIMANTS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION. (a) A person is entitled to compensation if:

(1) the person has served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state; and
(2) the person:
(A) has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced; or
(B) has been granted relief on the basis of actual innocence of the crime for which the person was sentenced.
(b) A person is not entitled to compensation under Subsection (a) for any part of a sentence in prison during which the person was also serving a concurrent sentence for another crime to which Subsection (a) does not apply.

The Austin Appeals Court accepted the Texas Attorney General’s argument “that ‘relief based on actual innocence’ in chapter 103 is a phrase that has acquired a specific, technical meaning that denotes collateral challenges to criminal convictions, based on ‘actual innocence,’ through habeas corpus.” If the phrase has “acquired” that meaning, however, then it did so somewhere besides in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. I’m not a lawyer, but there’s nothing explicit in the statutory language that mentions habeas proceedings anywhere.

In any event, we’ve surely not heard the last of this case. Though a three judge panel ruled against the defendant on July 31, last week the defense asked for a hearing by the full Austin appellate court. Here’s the opinion by the three judge panel (pdf). If the full court rules against Mr. Young, this question may be settled ultimately by the Texas Supreme Court.

When a defendant pleads not guilty, claims innocence throughout, is convicted anyway, spends time in prison, then wins their freedom on appeal because there was never sufficient evidence to convict in the first place, why shouldn’t they be considered among the class of exonerated innocents described in Chapter 103 who are eligible for compensation?

In other words, why shouldn’t the innocence that’s “presumed” by criminal law be considered “actual innocence”? Isn’t that a distinction without a difference?

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